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40
Blockholders, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia.pdf
This paper illustrates how blockholders can attenuate managerial myopia. Blockholders have a strong incentive to investigate the cause of poor interim nancial performance, since they can sell their stake if losses are due to low rm quality rather than e cient long-term investment. Their trades impound this information into prices, bringing them closer to fundamental value. This increased market e ciency encourages managers to exploit positive-NPV growth opportunities that reduce short-term earnings. This bene t is particularly strong in rms with abundant long-term opportunities that exhibit infor- mation asymmetry. The model therefore justi es the prevalence of small blockholders in the U.S. by showing that they can add value even if they lack the intervention rights as- sumed by existing theories. Block size has a non-monotonic e ect on rm value. A higher stake allows blockholders to sell more upon bad news and thus encourages information acquisition. However, if bloc
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41
Do Outside Blockholders Influence Corporate Governance....pdf
Do Outside Blockholders Influence Corporate Governance…
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35
The international evidence on performance and equity ownership by insiders, blockholders, and institutions.pdf
The international evidence on performance and equity ownership by insiders, blockholders, and institutionsThe international evidence on performance and equity ownership by insiders, blockholders, and institutionsThe international evidence on performance and equity ownership by insiders, blockholders, and institutions
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37
Blockholders, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia.pdf
This paper shows how blockholders can add value even if they cannot intervene in a rm s operations. Blockholders have incentives to monitor the rm s fundamental value, since they can sell their stakes upon bad news. By trading on their private information (following the Wall Street Rule ), they cause prices to reect fundamental value rather than current earnings. This in turn encourages managers to invest for long-run growth rather than short-term pro ts. Contrary to the view that the U.S. s liquid stock markets and transient shareholders exacerbate myopia, this paper shows that they can encourage investment by impounding its e ects into prices.
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38
BANKS AS A FIRM´S BLOCKHOLDERS.pdf
BANKS AS A FIRM´S BLOCKHOLDERS
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29
Agency Costs, Information Asymmetry and Blockholders in :代理成本,信息不对称和大股东在.pdf
Agency Costs, Information Asymmetry and Blockholders in ：代理成本，信息不对称和大股东在in,代理,帮助,and,信息不对称,代理成本,costs,成本,Costs
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23
counterbalance mechanism of blockholders and tunneling of cash dividend evidences from chinese listed companies from 1999 to 2003.pdf
counterbalance mechanism of blockholders and tunneling of cash dividend evidences from chinese listed companies from 1999 to 2003
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31
Blockholders and Corporate Governance.pdf
Blockholders and Corporate Governance
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22
Conflicting voices of blockholders implications for financing....pdf
Conflicting voices of blockholders implications for financing…
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11
do managers make takeover financing decisions that circumvent more effective outside blockholders.pdf
do managers make takeover financing decisions that circumvent more effective outside blockholders
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