Who´s Minding the Store? Motivating and Monitoring Hired Managers at Small, Closely Held Firms: The Case of Commercial Banks

本文档由 enbook 分享于2010-11-10 04:34

We test whether the gains from hiring an outside manager exceed the principal-agent costs of owner- manager separation at 266 small, closely held U.S. commercial banks. Our results suggest that hiring an outside manager can improve a bank´s profit efficiency, but that these gains depend on aligning the hired managers with owners via managerial shareholdings. We ..
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管理/人力资源  —  经营企划
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Agency Costs Corporate Governance Commercial banks Small Business Profit 商业银行 小型企业 利润效率
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hired banks managers minding closely held
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